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Abstract 
Systems security engineering (SSE) is a complex, 
manually intensive process, with implications for cost, 
time required, and repeatability/reproducibility. This 
paper describes BluGen, an analytic framework that 
generates risk plots and recommends prioritized miti-
gations for a target mission/system environment based 
on a stated level of threat and risk tolerance.  The goal 
is to give working system security engineers a head 
start in their analysis. We describe BluGen in the con-
text of Design Science Research and evaluate accord-
ingly. 
1. Introduction 
As typically practiced today, systems security en-
gineering (SSE) is a complex, manually intensive pro-
cess, with implications for cost, time required, repeat-
ability, and reproducibility [1][2].  A key driver in SSE 
is the need to develop an understanding of mis-
sion/business risk due to cyber attack (henceforth we 
simply say mission risk). An understanding of risk 
then informs mitigation prioritization. Risk-based ap-
proaches are increasingly mandated in government 
and industry with the arrival of standards such as the 
US National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) Risk Management Framework (RMF) [3] and 
the United States Department of Defense implementa-
tion of RMF [4].  
Given the sometimes rapid evolution of mission, 
system, and threat, such assessments are perishable 
and must be periodically updated, with mitigations ad-
justed accordingly. Hence, the SSE community ur-
gently needs ways to reduce cycle time and effort in 
the SSE process.  
While many SSE-related automation tools exist, 
they tend to be narrowly focused in areas such as vul-
nerability scanning, e.g., Open VAS [5] and software 
static analysis, e.g., ESC/Java [6]; or they focus on 
capturing compliance/requirements data that subject 
matter experts (SMEs) manually create [7][8].   
Thus, a gap currently exists for tools to help the se-
curity engineer work from threat through to security 
controls. Specifically, we have found that a gap exists 
for automation solutions that meet the requirements in 
Table 1, which we derived from performing SSE over 
a seven year period. The primary research question ex-
plored in this paper is whether creating an automated 
tool that meets the requirements in Table 1 and thus 
the gap identified, can provide SSEs with a measurable 
head start in their work, allowing more efficient use of 
their time to provide an engineering result at least as 
good as or better than one derived via manual methods.   
Table 1 – Requirements 
ID Requirement 
R1 
Analyze threat, mitigation, and entity data to esti-
mate attack exposure. 
R2 
Estimate attack consequence/impact based on criti-
cality inputs (mission impact of compromises to data 
on a specific asset). 
R3 
Assess risk by generating risk plots of exposure vs. 
criticality based on R1 and R2. 
R4 
Recommend mitigations for entities based on risk as-
sessed in R3 and a stated level of risk tolerance. 
R5 
Be able to analyze systems in the early concept 
phase as well as existing systems. 
R6 Produce results that are repeatable and reproducible. 
R7 
Be usable in a range of environments, e.g., from en-
terprise IT settings to industrial control settings. 
R8 
In terms of time required to complete SSE, do no 
worse and ideally better than traditional manual SSE. 
R9 
Allow engineers to produce an SSE solution that is 
at least as good as one produced via manual SSE. 
 
The research contribution of this paper is an entity- 
and capability-centric framework called BluGen that 
is intended to meet the requirements in Table 1.  
 
Figure 1 – Applicability of BluGen 
The terms entity and capability are defined below. 
BluGen is primarily focused on SSE analysis steps 
from threat to security control identification that are 
part of the larger Systems Engineering (SE) process 
(Figure 1). 
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The theoretical foundation of BluGen rests on at-
tack-centric risk assessment frameworks, as exempli-
fied by NIST [9] and the International Standards Or-
ganization [10], where risk is a function of attack like-
lihood and mission consequence if the attack is suc-
cessful. However, BluGen goes beyond attack-based 
risk approaches, as discussed in Section 2, by focusing 
on attacker/defender capabilities at the entity/asset 
level, with an exposure metric replacing likelihood of 
attack. 
Figure 2 presents core BluGen constructs, with a 
small sampling of entity types. As with other figures 
in this paper, the figure is expressed using the Unified 
Modeling Language [11].  BluGen analyzes various 
entity types. The term “entity” refers to either missions 
supported by a target cyber environment, cyber assets, 
data processed, or the roles that people play in that en-
vironment. By “capability,” we refer to (1) a particular 
proficiency, dubbed a “red capability,” that an attacker 
can use to achieve a discrete step in a cyber attack or 
(2) a particular proficiency, dubbed a “blue capabil-
ity,” that can help to mitigate an attack. By “mitigate” 
we mean the capability to identify, prevent, detect, re-
spond, and/or recover [12] from the effects of one or 
more red capabilities  that are composed into a cyber 
attack.  Entities are the targets of capabilities, both red 
and blue.   
 
Figure 2 – Core constructs used in BluGen 
An example of a red capability is “Uses moderately 
sophisticated social engineering techniques.” An ex-
ample of a blue capability that could help to mitigate 
this red capability is “Provides basic security-related 
training to information system users.” The “entities” 
in this example are human users who play roles in the 
use/operation of a target information system. 
The rest of this paper contains sections on back-
ground and related work, evaluation, artifacts, discus-
sion, conclusions/future work, and references. 
2. Background and Literature Review 
In this section, we provide background and review 
of the literature and describe how SSE has often been 
superficially approached in the past, how SSE has 
been in need of stronger processes and related automa-
tion, and how vulnerability- and attack-centric ap-
proaches have thus far proven difficult to automate. 
SSE is an SE sub-discipline that has as its primary 
goal the effective management of risk to mission ob-
jectives that could result from cyber-attacks against 
systems supporting those missions [13][14][9].  
Historically, standards organizations and govern-
ments have put forward standards and policies that 
have not required strong SSE processes but have often 
instead focused on a compliance-oriented approach 
driven by checklists of security controls.  For example, 
Federal Information Processing Standard 199 [15], 
CNSS Instruction 1253 [16], the DoD Information As-
surance Certification and Accreditation Process (DIA-
CAP), and  [17] have unintentionally encouraged su-
perficial security engineering analysis by not requiring 
substantive assessment of the cyber threat and risk that 
then informed prioritized mitigation to objectively 
bring the highest risks down to an acceptable level.  In 
addition to government standards, industry standards, 
such as the Payment Card Industry Security Standards 
Council [18], have similarly encouraged a compli-
ance-oriented approach to security. 
Government and industry have begun taking the 
risks associated with the cyber threat more seriously in 
recent years [19]. For example, International Stand-
ards Organization (ISO) Standard 27001 [10] has a 
strong risk focus.  In addition, the RMF now requires 
that risk assessments of the cyber threat be carried out 
as the basis for creating and prioritizing mitigation-re-
lated requirements [9][20].   
So while the need to carry out risk assessments and 
select appropriate mitigations based on risk manage-
ment decisions has now become widely acknowledged 
and written into broad-based policies, it is also increas-
ingly recognized  that commonly used risk assessment 
and mitigation engineering procedures tend to be ex-
cessively time consuming and potentially error-prone 
because they are fundamentally manual processes car-
ried out by SMEs; automation, including related mod-
els and analytics, is thus required [21][22][23].  
The degree to which SSE risk and mitigation pro-
cesses can be automated depends in part on the under-
lying approach taken to risk assessment and SSE. 
Cyber assessment approaches have historically been 
vulnerability-centric, attack-centric, or some combina-
tion of the two. 
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In a vulnerability-centric assessment, e.g., [24] and 
[25], risk is lowered through a process of discovering 
and remediating (e.g., patching) vulnerabilities in the 
affected systems. Vulnerability scanning tools such as 
Nessus [26] and nmap [27] can assist in such assess-
ments. Assessing risk based on identifying vulnerabil-
ities, however, can at best identify only a small per-
centage of the total set of vulnerabilities in a system 
due to the difficulty of identifying so-called zero day 
vulnerabilities that are generally believed to be present 
in abundance in complex cyber-intensive systems 
[28]. Heart Bleed [29] and vulnerabilities present in 
Adobe Flash, e.g., [30], are two examples of serious, 
broad-based vulnerabilities that went undiscovered for 
years. A further difficulty in taking a vulnerability-
centric approach is that systems that contain vulnera-
bilities may be frozen in their configurations, with 
patching disallowed because of the disruptive nature 
of doing so and/or the loss of “certification” of altering 
systems that have been approved for operation in a 
particular locked down configuration.  Common ex-
amples of such systems include military and critical 
infrastructure systems. 
Attack-centric approaches (e.g., [9][31][32]) ana-
lyze risk by enumerating potential cyber attacks and 
scoring each attack by likelihood of occurrence and 
mission impact. As with approaches that attempt to 
enumerate vulnerabilities, approaches that attempt to 
enumerate potential attacks are challenging because of 
the vast attack surfaces that complex cyber-intensive 
systems expose.   
Attack-based methodologies typically require 
manual attack scoring that depends on cyber and mis-
sion SMEs for attack likelihood and impact scoring, 
respectively. However, manual scoring does not scale.  
For example, an attack-based risk analysis of a modest 
system (e.g., 4 mission threads, 40 nodes, 4 attack vec-
tors, 3 attack effects, and 4 data items/node on aver-
age) can require an upper bound of 7,680 (=440434) 
unique attack contexts to be scored for likelihood and 
impact. 
Consequently, SMEs tend to consider a fraction of 
the attack surface using small, typically non-random 
samples with attendant concerns about how well such 
samples generalize to the entire attack surface.  In ad-
dition, such assessments are time consuming and sub-
ject to the effects of SME-bias in assigning scores 
along ordinal scales.  While some progress has been 
made in automating impact scoring, e.g., [33] and [34], 
approaches to automating attack likelihood scoring re-
main in their infancy.  Furthermore, there is thus far 
no clear-cut automation path that leads from attack-
centric risk assessment to mitigation analysis. 
3. Method 
We characterize and analyze BluGen in terms of 
Design Science Research principles [35][36]. In par-
ticular, we use Hevner’s Information Systems Re-
search Framework (Figure 3) to analyze BluGen, as 
discussed in the validation section later.   
 
Figure 3 – Hevner IS Research Framework 
We use the framework to evaluate the BluGen 
framework itself, along with two models and four 
methods contained within the framework and an in-
stantiation of the framework. 
4. Artifact Description 
This section describes BluGen artifacts, which are 
summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2 – Artifact Summary 
Artifact Type BluGen Artifact 
Framework BluGen itself 
Models Environment, Reference Catalog 
Methods 
Risk, Exposure, Criticality, Mitiga-
tion 
Instantiation BluGen proof of concept 
Following a discussion of the design search pro-
cess that we followed to arrive at the artifacts in the 
table, each of the BluGen artifacts is described. 
Design Search 
In terms of design as a search process for BluGen 
[37], we  note that SSEs using attack-centric ap-
proaches like Mission Information Risk Analysis 
(MIRA) [38] tend to use some variant of the following 
basic steps when carrying out risk assessment and mit-
igation processes manually. The presumption in these 
steps is that the analyst will reference the Defense Sci-
ence Board [19] threat tiers to conduct attack level of 
effort scoring.  The tiers range from I to VI, with lower 
tier threat actors less capable than higher tier actors. 
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1. Identify a set of potential hypothetical attacks to 
study against the target system environment.  For 
each attack, follow the steps below. 
2. Determine the worst case mission impact if the 
attack is successful. 
3. Break the attack into the most likely steps and 
determine the attack (red) capabilities needed in 
each step of the attack. 
4. Set the overall attack level of effort/capability 
score equal to the highest Defense Science Board 
(DSB) tier associated with any of the red capa-
bilities from step 3. 
5. For attacks with impact and effort scores that ex-
ceed the risk tolerance levels of mission/system 
stakeholders, consider mitigation possibilities 
for each red capability in the attack, as described 
in the steps below. 
6. For each red capability, determine the blue capa-
bilities needed to mitigate the red capability. 
7. Compare the blue capabilities already applied to 
the entity or entities under consideration. 
8. If a needed blue capability is not already speci-
fied, then recommend that it be included.  
 We observed that the data and mappings associ-
ated with step 3, 6, 7, and 8 are invariant of the details 
of any given target environment, assuming the entity 
types in that environment are already known and 
mapped. This observation led us to the idea that cap-
turing such data and mappings in a “Reference Cata-
log” (Figure 4) and reusing the data across SSE anal-
yses could save engineers time and lead to more con-
sistent scoring. Taking this idea a step further, we be-
lieved that cross referencing this data (e.g., threats and 
mitigations to entities and mitigations to threats) could 
be automated through an analytic that mimics the steps 
described earlier. 
 
Figure 4 – Reference Catalog concept 
The original concept behind Figure 4 was sketched 
in [39].  As the figure shows, blue capabilities that mit-
igate red capabilities are mapped to those red capabil-
ities in a many-to-many fashion. Similarly, blue and 
red capabilities map many-to-many to entity types 
based on relevance, as not every capability is applica-
ble to every entity type. 
In relating capabilities to individual cyber attacks, 
we observe that attack capabilities possessed by a 
threat actor can be composed in various combinations 
and sequences to represent any possible cyber attack; 
that is, capabilities are the “atoms” from which attacks 
are constructed. We thus justify the capability-based 
approach on the basis that if we are able to use blue 
capabilities to mitigate (e.g., prevent or ameliorate the 
effect) at the red capability level, then any attacks 
composed from those red attack capabilities would be 
thus disrupted.  
Figure 5 illustrates the concept. The figure shows 
five sample cyber attacks in the abstract broken down 
into individual steps.  For this example, each attack 
uses “red capability 123” in one of its steps.  Capabil-
ity 123 might be, for example, “Can use brute force 
searches to defeat strong hashes protected by strong 
passwords.” Preventing or disrupting the success of 
this particular capability would potentially prevent or 
disrupt attacks composed in part from this capability.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 – Disrupting attack and attack effects by dis-
rupting component capabilities used in attack steps 
As red capability mitigation coverage becomes 
more complete, fewer attacks composed from those 
capabilities have a chance of succeeding because 
fewer unmitigated red capabilities are available from 
which to compose the attacks. 
Models 
BluGen has two main models: an Environment 
model and a Reference Catalog model.  
Environment Model 
The Environment model describes the target mis-
sion/cyber environment, any existing mitigations, and 
related analysis parameters that BluGen analyzes for 
risk and mitigations. The Environment model consists 
of the following elements:  threat level expected, risk 
tolerance, environment description, and criticality, as 
discussed below. 
The threat level expected is an integer in the range 
of one to six and represents a mapping to one of the 
threat tiers defined in Gosler [19].  Risk tolerance con-
sists of two metrics called exposure and criticality that 
are expressed as percentages (range 0.0 to 1.0).  The 
metrics are described below. Whenever an entity’s ex-
posure and criticality scores both exceed the corre-
sponding risk tolerance values, BluGen recommends 
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mitigations to bring entity exposure down below the 
specified criticality level.  
The environment description describes the target 
cyber environment to be assessed by BluGen and con-
tains three key sets: M, a set of missions; E, a set of 
entities; and D, a set of data types.  The entities in E 
support the missions in M by processing data in D. Be-
low we follow the convention that variables i, j, and k 
index objects from E, M, and D respectively, with 
 ei  E, 1 ≤ i ≤ |E|; 
 mj  M, 1 ≤ j ≤ |M|; and 
 dk  D, 1 ≤ k ≤ |D|. 
Each entity instance consists of a name, an optional 
description, an entity type, and a set of blue capabili-
ties that have already been mapped to the entity. The 
entity type must map onto one of the entity types found 
in the Reference Catalog model (discussed below). If 
a new entity type is encountered that is not in the Ref-
erence Catalog, it must be added and mapped accord-
ingly. One type of entity is the mission entity. For mis-
sion entities, the environment description includes the 
overall weight of each mission relative to the other di-
rectly supported missions; weights are typically deter-
mined by SMEs. Mission weights should sum to 1.0 
for a given Environment model instance. 
The criticality component of the Environment 
model consists of a set of so-called “raw” criticality 4-
tuples.  Each criticality triple, (mj, ei, dk), is a unique 
combination of three values: a given mission, m, a 
given entity, e, and a given mission data element, d. 
Note that not every possible triple in the Cartesian 
product of MED represents a viable combination, as 
not every data type is associated every entity, and not 
every entity is associated with every mission.  
Associated with each raw criticality triple is a crit-
icality score expressed as a percentage (range 0.0 to 
1.0), with 0.0 meaning not mission-critical at all and 
1.0 meaning maximal mission criticality. Criticality 
means the worst case mission impact (“mission kill”) 
if a cyber compromise were to occur in the context de-
fined by the triple. For example, one of many critical-
ity triples for a robot might be: (m=navigate, e=sensor, 
d=location) and the worst case impact for the triple 
might be found to be 1.0 (due to, say, an integrity at-
tack on d=location in the m=navigate and e=sensor 
context).  
BluGen does not prescribe how raw criticality 
scores are derived; the scores could be assigned by 
SMEs or they could come about from running a mis-
sion performance model that can model cyber effects 
and automatically determine related mission impacts, 
e.g., [34]. The former would typically provide scores 
along an ordinal scale, while the latter would typically 
provide scores along a ratio scale based on mission 
performance metrics. The latter is more desirable to 
avoid potential SME bias. 
Reference Catalog Model 
The other BluGen model is the Reference Catalog, 
which consists of (1) a set of red capabilities that at-
tackers can compose into attacks, (2) a set of blue ca-
pabilities representing potential mitigations to red ca-
pabilities, (3) an entity type taxonomy, (4) a set of 
mappings between blue and red capabilities, and (5) a 
set of mappings between capabilities and entity types 
in the taxonomy, as given in Figure 4.  Mappings of 
both types are many-to-many.  A mapping of a blue 
capability to a red capability means that the blue capa-
bility can, potentially in concert with other blue capa-
bilities, help to mitigate the corresponding red capabil-
ity. A mapping from red and blue capabilities to a 
given asset type in the asset type taxonomy means that 
the capability is relevant to (can affect) the corre-
sponding asset type. 
The red capability set can be taken from a threat 
model, such as the DoD CIO/AT&L threat model [40].  
The blue capability set can, in part, be derived from a 
security control catalog, such as NIST 800-53 [41].   
We expect the entity taxonomy to be organically 
grown over time, though data mining against existing 
sources may be done. For example, the National Vul-
nerability Database can provide an initial set of asset 
types, where assets are one type of entity.  
Methods 
The BluGen framework supports four basic meth-
ods:  Risk, Exposure, Criticality, and Mitigation.   
Risk.  The Risk (1) method computes mission risk 
due to cyber effects (e.g., attacks) for each entity, ei, 
and is the product of two additional methods, Expo-
sure and Criticality, described below.  
 
Exposure. The Exposure method computes how 
“exposed” (open to attack) an entity is. For a given en-
tity, ei, exposure is computed as given in (2). 
 
In (2), trc(ei) is the total number of red capabilities 
that threaten the type associated with entity  ei, and 
urc(ei) is the number of those red capabilities for which 
no blue capability has currently been mapped, as iden-
tified in the environment description given in the En-
vironment model. The Exposure method retrieves both 
5972
   
  6 
red and blue capabilities by entity type from the Ref-
erence Catalog model. 
The set of red capabilities that threaten a given en-
tity type, trc(ei), is the union of the red capabilities di-
rectly mapped to the entity type and the red capabili-
ties of the entity type’s parent, recursively up to the 
root of the taxonomy. Figure 6 illustrates the concept 
with an example.  On the left hand side of the figure, 
the red capabilities for a given CISCO router consists 
of the red capabilities tied directly to the router plus 
those for parents leading to the root (CISCO Router, 
Router, and Network Device). 
 
Figure 6 – Determining Exposure 
  The figure also highlights the fact that BluGen 
can be useful early in the system development process 
when the architecture is only known at a more abstract 
level.  In such cases, many asset types are identified in 
generically terms (e.g., “router”) since design details 
have not yet solidified.  Nonetheless, threats can still 
be assessed using the same process, but starting from 
the more generic asset types closer to the root of the 
entity type taxonomy. 
The right side of Figure 6 illustrates how the Expo-
sure method gathers blue capabilities for a given asset 
instance.  The Environment model allows one to spec-
ify an optional parent for a given entity instance.  For 
example, the parent of a workstation might be the seg-
ment of an enterprise network.  So, in a manner anal-
ogous to determining red capabilities for an entity 
type, the blue capabilities tied to a given entity in-
stance are the union of the blue capabilities directly 
mapped to the entity instance joined together with the 
blue capabilities of the entity’s parent(s), recursively. 
Unlike the Reference Catalog entity taxonomy, rela-
tionships in the environment form a directed acyclic 
graph. 
Criticality. The Criticality method computes the 
worst case mission impact/criticality if an entity is at-
tacked. An entity is more mission-critical if a greater 
number of highly weighted missions rely on the entity 
and a greater number of high criticality data types are 
processed there. An overall asset’s criticality is com-
puted from a set of incoming criticality scores supplied 
from the Environment model. 
To capture this notion mathematically, we compute 
raw criticality, rc(ei), for each entity ei, as given in (3), 
where mw(mj) is the mission weight for mission j, and 
crit(ei,mj,dk) is the assigned mission criticality, a value 
between 0 and 1 inclusive, for the triple (ei,mj,dk) that 
comes in as input to BluGen from the Environment 
model.  
 
The final criticality/mission impact for a given en-
tity, fc(ei), is the ratio of the raw criticality for the en-
tity divided by the maximum raw criticality found 
across the entire entity set (4). 
 
Thus, criticality values are expressed as a percent-
age of the maximum entity criticality found in the en-
vironment description given in the Environment 
model. 
Mitigation. The Mitigation method computes the 
recommended set of mitigations, entity-by-entity, re-
quired to bring risk down to an acceptable level, as 
specified by the Environment model. For a given en-
tity instance in the Environment model, we use the 
Reference Catalog model to look up the red capabili-
ties that map to the entity based on its type.  We then 
look up the blue capabilities that mitigate the red ca-
pabilities.  If we call the resulting set M1 and we define 
set M2 as the blue capabilities currently mapped to the 
entity instance based on the environment description, 
then the missing mitigations are just M1 – M2.  The 
set M3 defined by (c | c  M2 and c  M1) represents 
superfluous blue capabilities that are currently mapped 
to the entity instance but are not useful with respect to 
the threat. 
Instantiation 
Figure 7 presents an architectural view of the 
BluGen proof-of-concept instantiation.  In this figure, 
each method described earlier is realized through a 
corresponding analytic (e.g., the Risk Method is real-
ized via the “Risk Analytic” in Figure 7). The instan-
tiation currently uses synthetic data for both the Envi-
ronment and the Reference Catalog models. The front-
end of the instantiation is implemented using Java and 
JavaFX [42]. 
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Figure 7 – BluGen Instantiation   
Figure 8 shows a sample risk plot produced by  
BluGen. The plot is typical of a target mission/system 
environment early in its lifecycle before mitigations 
have been tied into the architecture.  Thus, mean ex-
posure levels tend to be high.   
As Figure 8 shows, the data points represent entity 
instances from the environment description, not indi-
vidual cyber attacks, as are traditionally represented 
on risk plots.  Note that entities can include not just 
hardware and software assets, but systems, networks, 
the roles people play, and data types. 
 
Figure 8 – Sample Instantiation Output 
Similarly, Figure 9 shows a sample mitigation rec-
ommendations report automatically generated by 
BluGen.  For each entity instance, the report shows the 
asset id and name, computed criticality and exposure 
scores, recommendations on which mitigations (blue 
capabilities) to add, and mitigations that could be re-
moved because they do not map to any threat (red ca-
pability) per the Reference Catalog model.  A given 
score is shown in red typeface if it exceeds the corre-
sponding risk tolerance. 
Mitigations in the Add column are missing blue ca-
pabilities (mitigations) that are required to fully miti-
gate the anticipated threat, as defined by red capabili-
ties tied to the asset type of the asset named on each 
row.  The Remove column identifies blue capabilities 
currently tied to the asset that do not contribute to the 
anticipated threat; thus, one might consider removing 
such blue capabilities to reduce overall system com-
plexity and attack surface and to potentially reduce 
costs. 
 
Figure 9 – Sample Mitigation Recommendations 
5. Evaluation 
Successful evaluation of BluGen is achieved by 
demonstrating the degree to which BluGen meets the 
requirements in Table 1. Before proceeding further, 
we state what is perhaps obvious: that BluGen is de-
pendent on the correctness of the Reference Catalog 
and Environment models, the content of which is, at 
least in part, SME-determined. SMEs must populate 
the catalog contents with reasonable red/blue capabil-
ities, entities, and related mappings. This section as-
sumes that SMEs have populated the Reference Cata-
log with “correct” content, meaning that the relevant 
entity types, red and blue capabilities, and required 
mappings are in place. Table 3 describes how BluGen 
meets the first seven requirements from Table 1.  
Table 3 – Meeting Requirements  
ID How Met by BluGen 
R1 
BluGen cross references red (threat) and blue (miti-
gation) capabilities with each other and to entities 
in the environment. With this information, BluGen 
computes an exposure metric, which is the ratio of 
unmitigated threats to the total number of threats 
that map by entity instance. 
R2 
Based on the criticality inputs, BluGen rolls up and 
computes mission criticality for each non-mission 
entity; that is, assets, roles, and data.  Criticality is a 
measure of mission consequence if the entity is at-
tacked. 
R3 
For each entity analyzed, BluGen plots the asset on 
a risk plot based on exposure and criticality scores. 
R4 
BluGen recommends mitigations for entities that 
score outside the risk tolerance region of the risk 
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ID How Met by BluGen 
plot.  Mitigations are based on reducing the entity 
exposure score to a level below the corresponding 
risk tolerance parameter. 
R5 
BluGen can analyze environment descriptions that 
reflect high level descriptions of entities typically 
known at the concept phase of a new program.  
BluGen can also analyze detailed Environment 
model descriptions typical of existing, deployed 
systems.  The only requirement is that the entity 
types from any such models are mapped into the 
Reference Catalog. 
R6 
Holding constant both models (Environment and 
Reference Catalog), we assert repeatability of 
BluGen results based on the fact that BluGen’s 
method implementations as algorithms will me-
chanically produce the same outputs given the same 
inputs.  We do not analyze whether the same SSE 
team using BluGen to analyze the same model data 
on two different occasions will produce a repeata-
ble result, as the focus of this paper is on BluGen 
itself.  However, our (untested) hypothesis is that 
the results would be more repeatable compared to 
having the same team repeat an SSE analysis with-
out the benefit of BluGen automation.  This belief 
is based on the fact that the SSE team will have less 
analysis to do because of the substantial head start 
that BluGen offers. We make a similar argument 
for reproducibility. Variability in the results of two 
different teams analyzing the same target environ-
ment with the same Reference Catalog will be due 
to team differences. 
R7 
The entity type taxonomy in the Reference Catalog 
model (Figure 6) is general enough to accommo-
date traditional IT assets as well as specialized asset 
types found in industrial control settings. Over 
time, the entity type taxonomy is expected to ex-
pand in depth and in breadth, to accommodate new 
types of entities encountered in the different envi-
ronments where BluGen is employed. 
 
Our plan for evaluation of requirements 8 and 9 re-
quires execution of an experiment.  The experiment is 
based on a two-group, posttest-only, randomized ex-
perimental design [44].  While the experimental de-
sign has been articulated, space considerations prevent 
full description in the current paper.   
Evaluation per Hevner DSRM Guidelines 
Table 4 briefly summarizes BluGen in terms of the 
guidelines from Hevner. 
Table 4 – Design Science Research Guidelines 
Guideline Discussion 
1 - Design as an 
artifact 
BluGen is described in terms of an inter-
related set of designed artifacts. 
2 - Problem rel-
evance 
Frameworks such as RMF now require or-
ganizations within the US government to 
Guideline Discussion 
assess and manage cyber risk to missions.  
We expect the number of required assess-
ments to grow non-linearly for the foresee-
able future, thus making purely manual 
SSE untenable. 
3 - Design eval-
uation 
We have evaluated 7 of 9 requirements 
with 2 requirements pending. 
4 - Research 
contributions 
Our contribution is the BluGen framework 
and related artifacts, which address the re-
quirements in Table 1 
5 - Research ri-
gor 
BluGen builds upon attack-centric risks 
assessment frameworks, as exemplified by 
NIST 800-30. 
6 - Design as 
search 
We considered various approaches (e.g., 
vulnerability, attack, and capability), and 
we factored out common steps carried out 
by SSEs that do not change from assess-
ment to assessment. 
7 - Research 
communication 
This paper is a first step in communicating 
BluGen. 
6. Discussion 
As of this writing, the experiment mentioned in the 
previous section has not been executed. A future paper 
will describe and discuss experimental results. 
It has not escaped notice that BluGen, while in-
tended initially to serve the defensive cyber commu-
nity could, in a trivial reformulation, be of use to those 
performing red team and penetration testing duties. In 
a reformulated BluGen (i.e., “RedGen”), the perspec-
tives are flipped, so, for example, the risk plot of 
BluGen becomes an “attack attractiveness” plot, with 
the exposure axis relabeled as the “opportunity” axis, 
as the plot highlights entities that have high exposure 
and thus represent potentially easy opportunity for at-
tacks for high impact attacks.   
7. Conclusion and Future Work 
In this paper, we described BluGen, an analytic 
framework that generates risk plots and recommends 
prioritized mitigations for a target mission/system en-
vironment based on a stated level of threat and risk tol-
erance.  
Assuming the overall approach passes experi-
mental validation, a possible future direction could be 
to prepare the BluGen Environment model input via 
automated means (today, model population is typically 
carried out manually).  Both system and mission map-
ping techniques would be required.  
The Reference Catalog mappings in the current 
BluGen instantiation were created by a small SME 
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team at Johns Hopkins APL. A future goal is to allow 
the larger cybersecurity community to peer review, 
update, and, most importantly, reuse the Reference 
Catalog as a shared community resource. Automated 
generation of mappings within the Reference Catalog 
is another area of possible exploration, using, for ex-
ample, a supervised machine learning approach. 
Currently, the mapping of mitigations to threats al-
lows for a single “solution” to mitigate a given set of 
threats. An enriched catalog could capture multiple al-
ternative solutions, that is, different mitigation ap-
proaches to address the same set of threats.  Each so-
lution could carry with it distinguishing attributes, 
such as estimates of solution acquisition cost, opera-
tional cost, mission performance cost, implementation 
complexity, and strength.  This setup would then allow 
an automated form of trade-space analysis based on a 
given set of attribute value inputs. 
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